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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. MORRISON, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH F. HORNE, 
Director of Zoning and 
Building of Salt Lake City, 
Appellant, 
Civil No. 9394 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONFORMING USE 
IN THE PROPERTY TO OPERATE A RETAIL GRO-
CERY STORE AND SERVICE STATION. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT MAY CHANGE FROM ONE NON-
CONFORMING USE TO ANOTHER NONCONFORMING 
USE WITHIN THE SAME CLASSIFICATION. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT 
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONF'ORMING, COMMER-
CIAL USE IN THE PROPERTY. 
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POINT IV. 
SECTION 8-4-6 OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ZONING ORDINANCES VIOLATES TIIE DUE PRO-
CESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STA'TEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent feels that the statement of facts 
contained in the brief of appellants is not complete, 
therefore respectfully submits the following in ad-
dition. 
Although the exact date that the building upon 
the property beeame vacant is not certain, there is 
no dispute in the fact that the building was used 
for a number of years as a general store, possibly 
as late as 1955. (R. 26) It is also not disputed 
that gasoline pump islands were constructed upon 
the premises for gasoline pumps which islands can 
be clearly seen in Exhibit P-3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT HAS A NONCONFORMING USE 
IN THE PROPERTY TO OPERATE A RETAIL GRO-
CERY STORE AND SERVICE STATION. 
The Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinance itself 
protects the nonconforming use of the property. 
Section 8-4-11 of the Salt Lake County Zoning Or-
dinance states, 
"The nonconforming use of land existing 
at the time this title became effective may be 
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continued, provided that no such nonconform-
ing use shall in any way be expanded or ex-
tended either on the same or adjoining pro-
perty; and provided that if such nonconform-
ing use of land, or any portion thereof, is 
abando1~ed or changed for a period of one ( 1) 
year or more any future use of such land shall 
be in conformity with the provisions of this 
ti tie." 
Since the building on the premises burned in 
September of 1960, it is respondent's position that 
Section 8-4-6 of the Zoning Ordinance is not ~applic­
able. Respondent is not seeking to occupy said build-
ing but contends that he has the right to construct 
a nonconforming bt1ilding under Section 8-4-5 of 
the ordinance which reads as follows: 
"A nonconforming building or structure 
occupied by a nonconforming use which is 
damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, wind, 
earthquake or other calamity or act of God, 
or the public enemy may be restored ~and the 
occupancy or use of such building, structure 
or part thereof which existed at the time such 
damage or destruction may be continued or 
resumed, provided that such restoration is 
started within a period of one year ( 1) and 
is diligently prosecuted to completion." 
Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance reads as follows : 
"A building or structure or portion there-
of occupied by a nonconforming use, which is, 
or hereafter becomes, vacant and remains 
unoccupied by a nonconforming use for a 
continuous period of one ( 1) year except for 
dwelling, should not thereafter be occupied 
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except by a use which confor1ns to the use 
regulations of the zone in which it is located." 
The words in the ordinance ''remains unoc-
cupied", if applicable in the instant case, must mean 
an abandonment as set forth in 8-4-11 of the ordin-
ance which connotates something more than circum-
stances over which the owner has no control which 
brings about a suspension of the use. Sections 8-4-6 
and 8-4-11 of the ordinance must be construed to-
gether. The legal meaning of the word "Discontinue" 
was construed in the case of State Ex. Rel. Schaetz 
vs. Manders, 206 Wis. 121 238 NW 835 quoted in 
114 ALR page 992, 
"It was plainly the intent of the ordinance 
to permit the continuance of nonconforming 
uses. While we have found that no authority 
construing the legal meaning of the "vord 
"discontinue" we think that ·as used in this 
ordinance it means something more than a 
mere suspension. It was not the intention of 
the ordinance to destroy the right of an owne1· 
to continue the use of his premises by the mere 
fact that his tenants became insolvent. 
We agree with the circuit court that 'dis-
continue' as it is used in the ordinance cannot 
mean a temporary nonoccupancy of the build-
ing or a temporary secession of the business. 
The word 'discontinue' as it is used in the 
ordinance is synonymous with 'abandonment'. 
It connotates a voluntary, affirm·ative, com-
pleted act. 
We thinl( that the rights secured to the 
owner by the terms of the ordinance is not 
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lost by either accident or unpropitious circun1-
stances over which he has no control, which 
brings about a mere suspension of the non-
conforming use. It is a right extended to him 
and to be enjoyed by him until he voluntarily 
1·elinquishes j t or abandons it.'' 
There is no proof that respondent or his pre-
decessors in interest have abandoned or so changed 
the use of the land so as to terminate the noncon-
forming use of the land. 
To effect an abandonment of the nonconform-
ing use of land, it is necessary to show ( 1 ) intent, 
involving a voluntary change and actual relinquish-
ment of right together with (2) some overt act 
carrying the implication that the owner does not 
claim or retain interest in the subject matter Landay 
vs. McWilliams, 173 Md. 460 196 A 29'3, 114 ALR 
984. 
In Binghamton vs. Gartell, 275 APP Div 457 
90 NYS 2d '556 is stated th'at an abandonment with-
, 
in the meaning of the rule that the right of a pro-
perty owner to continue a nonconforming use may 
be lost through abandonment of such use connotates 
a voluntary, affirmative, completed act and means 
something more than a mere suspension, a temporary 
non-occupancy of building or temporary ceasing of 
business activities. (Also cited 18 ALR 2d- Zoning 
- Resuming Nonconforming use 18 ALR 2d 725, 
pages 730-731). 
;_) 
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Lapse of time is not, per se, decisive of whether 
a nonconforming use has been abandoned, it being 
merely one of the factors vvhich may evidence such 
an intention. 18 ALR 2d page 7'25 at page 731. 
The fact that respondent and his predecessors 
in interest in the property continue to pay commer-
cial taxes as assessed on the property indicates that 
there was no intention to abandon the commercial 
nonconforming use on the property (Exhibit P -1) . 
In addition, the evidence showed that there was 
during periods of nonoccupancy for rent and for sale 
signs on the property. (R. 27) Periods of interrup-
tion of a nonconforming use due to the owner's in-
ability to obtain a tenant or to sell the property does 
not amount to an abandonment. In Haulenbeek vs. 
Allanhurst, 1948 57 A 2d 5'2, 18 ALR 2d 747, it 
appeared that ~at the time the zoning ordinance was 
adopted and long before the building in question 
was operated as a hotel, and was used in this cap-
acity at least two years after the issuance of the 
zoning ordinance under which the hotel constituted 
the nonconforming use. 
"For the following eleven years the his-
tory of the building was quite varied due to 
the financial difficulties of the owner and his 
inability to obtain a tenant. Thus the building 
was empty for several years with interrupted 
various efforts to operate it for the purpose 
intended. For two years the building was oc-
cupied by the United States Army; and there-
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after the owner attempted to operate it again 
as a hotel. I-Iolding that there was no ~abandon­
ment or discontinuance of a non-conforming 
use, so as to require a future use in compliance 
with the zoning ordinance, the court stated 
that the effort here had been to overcome the 
difficulties of an economic depression and 
wartime exigencies ~and that these acts could 
not be considered such a substantial change 
as to amount to an abandonment or discon-
tinuance of the nonconforming use." 
18 ALR 2d 7 48 states: 
"The fact that the nonconforming use 
was suspended because of fin'ancial difficul-
ties of the owner may negative an intention 
on his part to abandon the nonconforming 
use." 
Temporary suspension of nonconforming use 
does not amount to an abandonment because of the 
seasonal ch'aracter of the work, or the lack of work, 
because of reduced business activity, because of war 
or other enforced nonuse such as a destruction, other-
wise than by voluntary act of the owner of the pre-
mises. 18 ALR 2d 740, 849-50-51-52~53-54. 
Zoning ordinances will be construed where pos-
sible to protect nonconforming uses; that is to say, 
an ordinance en'acted pursuant to a zoning law will 
be construed, if possible, as not effecting lawful 
buildings, property rights, business and uses. Mc-
Quillan Municipal Corporations 3rd Edit. Revised, 
Vol. 8, Section 25-184 page 475. Furthermore, 
"Zoning ordinances, being in derogation 
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of common law property rights will be strictly 
construed and any ambiguity or uncertainty 
decided in favor of property owners." Kubby 
vs. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17 198 Pack 2d 134 
page 138; City of Little Rock vs. Williams, 
177 SW 2d 924; 440 East 1 02nd St. Corp. vs. 
Murdock, 285 NY 298 34 NE 2d 329. 
We must assume that Judge A. H. Ellett, trial 
judge, made all necessary findings of fact essential 
to support his ruling. 
"Where findings of fact have not been 
made the rule is that the judgment should be 
affirmed if there is any theory of the case on 
which such judgment can be sustained and any 
reasonable evidence in the record supporting 
such theory." Kubby vs. Hammond, 68 Ari-
zona 17 198 Pac. 2d 134 page 137. Grizzle vs. 
Runbeck, 244 Pac. 2d 1160 at page 1162. 
It is submitted that in the instant case the tax 
assessments and tax roll showing this property to 
have been taxed as "Commercial-Industrial" as 
shown in P-1 is sufficient evidence alone to sustain 
the ruling of the trial court. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT MAY CHANGE FROM ONE NON-
CONFORMING USE TO ANOTHER NONCONFORMING 
USE WITHIN THE SAME CLASSIFICATION. 
Appellant states in its brief that if respondent 
has a nonconforming use "that nonconforming right 
is only to use the premises as a general store." Res-
pondent contends that ·a nonconforming use for a 
retail grocery store may be changed to a retail service 
station. 
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Section 8-1-6 of the ordinance contains the defi-
nitions of words and terms used therein, "Use", how-
ever, is nowhere defined. 
The common law definition of the word "use" is 
found in 58 Am. Jur. page 1021. 
"A nonconforming use within the mean-
ing of zoning regulations has been defined ~as 
the use of the building or land that does not 
agree with the use district to which it is situ-
ated." 
It is and has been respondent's position that 
Section 8-4-9 of the Zoning ordinance does not 
prohibit different activities within the same non-
conforming use; that is, nonconforming use having 
a relation to classification. The nonconforming use 
classification of the property in question is con-
sidered by respondent to be "nonconforming C-1". 
This is the lightest commercial classification. "Non-
conforming C-1" permits both retail gasoline sta-
tions and a.retail grocery store. 
In the case of Nyberg vs. Solmson, 205 Md. 150 
106 A 2d 483 46 ALR 2d, 1051, the owner of non-
conforming property operated a new car ·agency 
and subsequently the same property was used for 
parking and storage of motor vehicles. Both were 
nonconforming uses, however, both were permissible 
in the first commercial use. The court held that it 
was permissible to change from the one nonconform-
ing use to the other and stated that "a nonconform-
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ing use m·ay be changed to a use of the same or higher 
classification." (See also the annotation "Right to 
Resume Non conforming Use After Period of Non-
use or of a Different Use From That In Effect At or 
Before the Time of Zoning.") 
114 ALR 991. 
"It may be stated generally that a mere 
temporary discontinuance of 'a prior noncon-
forming use will not of itself show an aban-
donment thereof so as to preclude resumption 
of such use." 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT 
RE8PONDENT HAS A N'ONCONFORMING, COMMER-
CIAL USE IN THE PROPERTY. 
Exhibit P-1 is the Salt Lake County Valuation 
Notice on the subject property showing it to be 
valued and assessed ·as "Commercial-Industrial"; 
and the same exhibit which is the assessment roll of 
Salt Lake County further shows that the subject 
property has been assessed as "Commercial-Indus-
trial" for the past five ( 5) years. 
The owner, Mr. Morrison, stated th'at before 
he bought the property he checked the valuation 
notices on the property and found it to be taxed as 
commercial property. He further stated that this 
commercial classification was one of the considera-
tions which induced him to purchase the property. 
( R. 19) . Trial court correctly observed ( R. 19) "I 
am quite certain that a man buying property would 
10 
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pay more for it if it is commercial and on a corner 
than he would if it was residential and on a corner.'' 
Anticipating respondent's reliance upon estop-
pel appellant has in Point No. 3 of its brief herein, 
stated that since the zoning ordin·ance itself is con-
stl'uctive notice of the zoning classification and 
owner or prospective purchaser of a nonconforming 
property cannot rely upon the assessment rolls as 
indicia of a nonconforming right. It is submitted that 
if taxp'ayers cannot rely on the official assessment 
notices regarding use of property it would take a 
judicial determination of every nonconforming oper-
ation to determine its status. 
The county can 'be estop·ped even in govern-
mental capacity where justice and equity require 
(see pocket supplement 1'9 Am. Jur. Sec. 167 page 
75), "and even in matters ~affecting its governmental 
power, it may be sometimes estopped if equity and 
justice demand it." 
Farrell vs. Placer County, 14'5 Pac. 2d page 
570 page 57. 
It is the essence of justice that there should 
not be two standards of conduct, one for the state 
and its political subdivisions and the other for its 
citizens. (See Semar vs. Fiskin, 210 Pac. 3'78 27 
ALR 1208). 
For Salt Lake County to assess and collect taxes 
on this property in the heavier tax bracket of "Com-
11 
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mercial-Indsutrial'' and then refuse to permit the 
activity for which it is taxed is unconscionable. 
POINT IV. 
SECTION 8-4-6 OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ZONING ORDINANCES VIOLATES THE DUE PRO-
CESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTA~H. 
Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance reads as follows: 
"A building or structure or portion there-
of occupied by a nonconforming use, which is, 
or hereafter becomes, vacant and remains un-
occupied by a nonconforming use for a contin-
uous period of one ( 1) year except for dwell-
ings, shall not thereafter be occupied except 
by a use which conforms to the use regula-
tions of the zone in which it is located." 
In the event Section 8-4-6 of the ordinance is 
construed so that "vacant and remains unoccupied" 
does not connotate an abandonment; that is not 
requiring something affirmative on the owner's part 
to show he voluntarily relinquishes his right, it is 
respondent's contention that Section 8-4-6 standing 
alone is unconstitutional and violates the due process 
clause of the constitutions of the United States and 
of the State of Utah, and further is the taking of 
property without just compensation. 
It is true that some courts have followed a rule 
which permits a zoning statute to do away with 
nonconforming uses after a statutory tolerance 
period and cite, for authority, the case relied upon 
12 
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by appellant, Standard Oil Company vs. City of 
Tallahassee, 5 Cir. 1950 183 F 2d 410, 412. 
Most cases, however, are based on the police power 
to terminate an obnoxious use, 
"Most of the cases that follow the latter 
rule do so on the grounds that the gradual 
abatement of use found detrimental to the 
health, morals, safety or general welfare is 
a proper exercise of the police power." 
Thompson on Real Property, 19'57, replace-
ments, Vol. lOA Pocket Supplement, Section 53'58. 
There h'as been no contention made by appel-
lant at any time that respondent's use of the pro-
perty for a retail grocery store and service station 
is a nuisance or obnoxious in any sense or that it 
would be detrimental in any way to health, morals, 
safety, or general welfare. In Buchanan vs. Warley, 
245 US 63 38 cases S. Ct. 60, 18 6'8 L. Ed. 149, the 
Supreme Court of the United States asserted, 
"Property is more than a mere thing 
which a person owns; it is elementary that 
it includes the right to acquire, use, and dis-
pose of it. The Constitution protects these es-
sential attributes of property." 
In Betty vs. City of Sidney, 79 Mont. 314 257 
Pac. 1007, 1009 56 ALR 872, we find, 
"The constitutional guarantee that no 
person shall be deprived of his property with-
out due process of law may be violated with-
out the physical taking of property for public 
or private use. Property may be destroyed or 
13 
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its value may be ~annihilated; it is owned and 
kept for some useful purpose and it has no 
value unless it can be used. Its capability for 
enjoyment and adaptability to some use are 
essential characteristics 'and attributes with-
out which property cannot be conceived. Hence 
any law which destroys it or its value or takes 
away any of its essential attributes deprives 
the owner of his property.'' 
In Chicago B & Q Railway Company vs. State 
of Illinois, 200 US 561 26 S. Ct. 341 350 50 L. Ed. 
596 we find the following: 
"The constitutional requirements of due 
process of law which embraces compensation 
for private property taken for public use ap-
plies in every case of the exertion of govern-
mental power. If, in the execution of any 
power, no matter what it is, the government, 
Federal or State, finds it necessary to take 
private property for public use it must obey 
the constitutional injunction to m~ake or se-
cure just compensation to the owner." 
In City and County of Denver vs. Denver Buick, 
Inc., 347 Pac. 2d, 919 at page 931 there is found 
this significant quote, 
"In ignoring or overlooking these basic 
tenets the law has been reduced to a state of 
contrarieties, where ownership envisions 
rights in the law of property, but only pri-
vileges in the law of zoning and city plan-
ning." 
If the ·appellants interpretation of Section 8-4-6 
of the ordinance is correct, it means that an owner 
14 
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of a nonconforming use has no rights but only the 
privilege to continue it, so long as it remains a pro-
fitable venture, so long as it is not destroyed by an 
act of God, so long as there is no war or other cir-
cumstance which prevents him from operating. Pro-
perty rights cannot be this fragile; the power of 
government cannot be this arbitrary. 
"There is another answer to the question 
of what derives from ownership. It has been 
tested in the crucible of time, and by reason 
of its merit, constitutional provisions were 
conceived and cast in its mold. By it an owner 
has more than a conferable privilege to use 
his property; he h~as a legal right, subject to 
certain restraints to enjoy and use his pro-
perty; his ownership and use springing there-
from are not privileges, but are rights which 
this government was instituted to protect." 
City and County of Denver vs. Denver Buick, 
Inc., 34 7 Pac. 2d, 919 at page 931. 
In Spann vs. City of Dallas, 235 SW 513, 515 
1 9ALR 1387 it states, 
"If the right of use be denied, the value 
of the property is annihilated and ownership 
is rendered a barren right." 
City a1ul County of Denver vs. Denver Buick, 
Inc., 347 P 2d 919, Page 932, 
''Unless the further use of property im-
perils the safety, health, comfort or general 
welfare of the community it appears that a 
denial of such use would be invalid. And a 
zoning restriction must have 'a reasonable and 
substantial relation to the safety, health, mor-
15 
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als or general welfare ; the connection may 
not be tenuous, vague or remote." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant having the burden to prove an aban-
donment of the nonconforming use cannot by mere 
lapse of time sustain the burden required to show 
an abandonment of nonconforming use. Under the 
universal rule that all presumtions are in support 
of the judgment; and where, as here, findings of 
fact have not been made, the rule is that judgment 
should be affirmed, if there is any reasonable evi-
dence to support it. 
In the event this court decides contrary to the 
ruling of the trial court with respect to the opera-
tion of 'a retail gasoline station, respondent respect-
fully requests that the court declare that respondent 
has a nonconforming use in the property for the 
operation of a retail grocery store. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES E. FAUST 
Attorney for Respondent 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Received a copy of the foregoing Brief of Res-
pondent this ________________ day of ________________________________ , 
A.D., 19'61. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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